In Baptista Boazio’s view of Cartagena, the English ships are among the largest objects on the sheet. The men who took the town are tiny figures marching along the beach. That disparity is a good introduction to the history of fighting at sea around South America. At a Caribbean port in 1586, on the Paraná in 1865 and in the Pacific roadstead of Iquique in 1879, some of the most consequential decisions concerned a few yards of water close to shore. Even the Battle of the River Plate, fought well out at sea in 1939, came to its conclusion in the approaches to a neutral harbour.
Cartagena, 1586
Francis Drake reached Cartagena de Indias, on the Caribbean coast of present-day Colombia, after the sack of Santo Domingo. His expedition carried soldiers as well as seamen. Christopher Carleill commanded the landing force, and the expedition narrative preserves a detail easily lost in the engraved panorama. The men marched before dawn along the seaward edge of the beach while the tide was out. Between the water and the defences across the neck of land, there was room to get within striking distance.
Seen from that strip of wet sand, Cartagena looks quite different from the city on Boazio’s sheet. The engraving gives a reader the anchorage, the marching column and the town in a single glance. Carleill’s men could see only the works immediately ahead. The seamen in the ships had another view again. Bringing those separate fields of vision together was part of the engraver’s achievement. It also gave the expedition a coherence on paper which few of its participants can have experienced.

The surviving papers extend well beyond the moment of capture. Walter Bigges, who had begun a narrative of the expedition, died at Cartagena. A fellow officer continued it. On the Spanish side, the commander of the local galleys, Pedro Vique Manrique, faced a death sentence after the defeat. An appeal on his behalf survives in the Drake collection at the Library of Congress. For the English publisher, Cartagena was one stop on a victorious itinerary. For the officer obliged to account for its loss, the same few hours became a matter of life and death.
Riachuelo, 11 June 1865
On a Sunday morning early in the War of the Triple Alliance, nine Brazilian steam vessels lay at anchor on the Paraná below Corrientes, in present-day Argentina. The Brazilian naval account places them in column on the Chaco side of the river. Across the channel, near the mouth of the Riachuelo, the banks rose high enough to carry artillery. Paraguay could bring fire to bear from vessels, from low gun platforms called chatas, and from the shore. A warship travelling along that reach might come under fire from all three.
The fate of the Brazilian corvette Jequitinhonha gives some measure of the danger. She grounded on a bank near the mouth of the Riachuelo. Her crew now faced shore guns from a position the ship could no longer leave. Elsewhere, Paraguayan boarding parties reached the deck of Parnaíba. The engagements remembered under the single name Riachuelo included a stranded corvette under bombardment and men fighting at arm’s length aboard another.
Brazilian commander Francisco Manuel Barroso still had a large vessel under power. He drove his flagship Amazonas into Paraguayan craft, using her hull as a weapon. The Brazilian victory secured the squadron’s position on the Paraná and severely reduced Paraguay’s capacity to contest the river with its fleet. The wreck of Jequitinhonha remained a conspicuous cost of that victory.
The painting at the head of this article depicts an earlier passage on the Paraná. In December 1851 a Brazilian squadron under John Pascoe Grenfell passed Argentine batteries at Tonelero. Eduardo de Martino placed a small boat on the near bank and a steamer in the light beyond it. Behind them the bluff rises above the squadron. Where Hoonholtz’s plan conveys the bend of a river, De Martino’s panorama conveys its height. Eduardo de Martino, Passage of the Tonelero.
Iquique and Punta Gruesa, 21 May 1879
When the Peruvian armoured ships Huáscar and Independencia arrived off Iquique, the main Chilean squadron was away. Two older Chilean vessels remained on blockade duty at what was then a Peruvian port. One was the wooden corvette Esmeralda, commanded by Arturo Prat. A boiler failure had reduced her speed to about three knots. The other, Carlos Condell’s gunboat Covadonga, could still make her way south close inshore. The difference in their condition helps explain why the fighting divided almost as soon as it began.
Vicente Zegers, a young midshipman in Esmeralda, wrote to his father from captivity a week later. He recalled Prat’s intention to keep the town behind the corvette, where a Peruvian shell passing over her might strike the waterfront. The personal letter preserves something a fleet diagram cannot convey. It records an officer’s recollection of the danger to the people ashore. Offshore, Miguel Grau brought Huáscar against the slow corvette. Prat was killed after boarding the monitor, and repeated blows from her ram sank Esmeralda.

At Punta Gruesa the relative draughts of the two ships mattered more than the weight of their guns. Covadonga crossed shallow water that the pursuing armoured frigate could not safely follow. Independencia struck a submerged obstruction and was lost. Her captain, Guillermo More, submitted his report the following day. Read alongside Zegers’s letter, it restores the other half of a morning often remembered through Prat’s death. Chile had lost a wooden corvette. Peru had lost one of its two principal armoured ships. For the remaining months of the campaign, a great deal would depend upon Grau and Huáscar.
Angamos, 8 October 1879
Nearly five months later, Huáscar and the Peruvian corvette Unión were returning north towards Arica. Off Antofagasta they encountered one Chilean division, which included Blanco Encalada. A second division under Juan José Latorre, in the armoured ship Cochrane, lay across their route farther north. The arrangement of the two Chilean forces explains why a sighting in darkness developed into a decisive interception the next morning. Turning away from one division brought the Peruvian ships towards the other. The faster Unión escaped.
The Chilean account records an interval between the first shot from Huáscar and Latorre’s reply. He held his fire while Cochrane closed to about 2,200 metres. One of the subsequent hits cut the chains connecting the monitor’s steering gear to her rudder. A shell striking the conning position killed Grau and his aide Diego Ferré. Under continuing fire, the surviving officers had to pass orders through a ship whose means of steering and communicating with the engine room had both been damaged.
Chile took Huáscar afloat, repaired her and put her into service under the Chilean flag. It is an unusual afterlife for a ship so closely identified with one commander. In May her ram had sunk Esmeralda. By October, her capture had given Chile greater freedom to move troops and supplies along the Pacific coast. The same hull belonged to the history of both navies, a circumstance which still gives accounts of Angamos in Peru and Chile their particular weight.
The River Plate, 13–17 December 1939
Commodore Henry Harwood had three widely separated places to consider when he tried to anticipate the German raider Admiral Graf Spee. Merchant traffic offered targets off Rio de Janeiro, the Falkland Islands and the River Plate. The distress call from the merchant steamer Tairoa on 3 December helped narrow the possibilities. Coming west of an earlier attack, it suggested that the raider was moving towards the shipping routes off South America. Harwood concentrated his available cruisers off the Plate. Exeter joined Ajax and the New Zealand-crewed Achilles on 12 December. Smoke appeared on the horizon the following morning.
Harwood sent Exeter to one side and the two light cruisers to the other. Captain Hans Langsdorff could concentrate his six 11-inch guns on one group, or divide their fire. Exeter bore the heaviest punishment and eventually withdrew. On the other flank Ajax and Achilles stayed in touch and followed the damaged German ship towards Montevideo. The distinction between fighting and shadowing matters here. At the end of the day Graf Spee could still steam into harbour under her own power.
Once she anchored, Uruguay’s neutrality gave the port authorities a say in how long she could remain for repairs. British diplomats sought time for reinforcements. The heavy cruiser Cumberland, absent from the original action, arrived late on 14 December. Langsdorff had to judge the strength waiting outside with incomplete information. On 17 December his crew took the ship out and scuttled her off Montevideo. That is why the best-known photographs of the wreck belong to a different day, and a different stretch of water, from the gun action that brought her there.

Laid side by side on Hendrik Hondius’s world map of 1630, Cartagena and the Río de la Plata occupy opposite ends of a long Atlantic coast. The map makes a fitting companion to Boazio’s harbour view. One gives the ocean crossing its proper scale. The other preserves the short walk along a beach on which an expedition’s fortunes turned.
Sources and Further Reading
- Cartagena. The Library of Congress holds Boazio’s engraved view. Its account of the Caribbean raid and catalogue of the Drake papers identify the expedition narrative and the Spanish appeal.
- Riachuelo and Tonelero. Brazilian naval journal Navigator, study of Riachuelo, with the navy’s service record for Jequitinhonha. For the cover painting, see Revista Marítima Brasileira on the passage at Tonelero.
- Iquique and Punta Gruesa. Vicente Zegers’s letter of 28 May, preserved by Memoria Chilena, and the Peruvian naval history reproducing More’s report.
- Angamos. The Chilean Navy’s chronology sets out the movements of the two divisions and the sequence of damage aboard Huáscar.
- River Plate. New Zealand’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage pairs a battle-track map with accounts of the cruiser action and the negotiations at Montevideo.